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The increasing cost ofmanpower in the United States Navy has generated a
new initiative identified as Smart Ship. Smart Ship, or the uses of technology for
manpower reduction, challenges the culture, tradition and policies of the Navy.
The life cycle cost for surface combatants can be reduced following the guidelines
of Smart Ship. However, limited analysis has been conducted into the material
readiness cost associated with reduced manning. It was the goal of this thesis to
concentrate on the cost and benefits of Smart Ship. A maximum savings of 0.54
percent of the total budget for the Department of the Navy is possible, using FY
1996 dollars. Through analysis conducted in the study, the current initiative of
reducing manpower costs has been determined to be risky and imprudent.
Nevertheless, the United States Navy should pursue Smart Ship to enhance combat
effectiveness and quality of life, thereby increasing fleet readiness, morale,
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Admiral Bradley Fiske wrote, "The question ofhow great a navy any country
needs depends, not on the size, but on the policies of that country, and on the navies of
the country 's that may oppose those policies. " [Ref. 1 :p. 114]. Today's shrinking
defense budget dictates a policy of reduced operating cost while maintaining mission
readiness.
The Department of the Navy (DoN) budget for FY 97 is $75,645 billion, a
decrease of 4.6 percent from FY 96, (see Table 1, Appendix A and B). This includes a
$730 million decrease in the DoN Military Personnel budget for active Naval personnel,
(MPN). However, it has been the single largest appropriation to increase in size as a
percentage of the total budget. The military personnel budget for active Naval personnel
is now 22.4 percent of the total DoN Budget for FY 97. This represents a 0.9 percent
Table 1 . Budget Summary by Appropriation for Military Personnel, Navy, and Operation
and Maintenance, Navy for FY95-FY97.
Appropriation FY95 FY96 FY97
Military Personnel, Navy 17,751.8 17,021.5 16,943.0
Operation and Maintenance, Navy 22,094.6 21,359.0 20,196.2
TOTAL BUDGET 80,417.7 79,252.3 75,645.0
Source: Derived from data provided by "Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 1 997 budget"
Note: Figures are in millions of dollars.
increase from FY 96, and a 5.7 increase from FY 85's active Naval personnel budget, the
peak of American military power during the Cold War, [Ref. 2:p. 1]. As the DoN budget
continues to shrink, the manpower cost will most likely continue to grow as a percentage
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Figure 1. Active Naval personnel pay as a percent of total Department of the Navy
budget
Many organizations, including the Department ofDefense (DoD), over
optimistically expected the draw-down to be over after the objectives of the bottom up
review (BUR) 1993, were met. BUR called for 346 active ships and some 406,000
personnel for the United States Navy by FY 99. During FY 97, DoN will obtain these
numbers. Meanwhile, the momentum of defense cuts have been so powerful it is predicted
by FY 99 there will only be 290 ships and fewer than 400,000 Navy personnel [Ref 2:p.
2]. To maintain 346 ships, a shipbuilding program of 10 ships per year must be in place.
Currently a program only exist for 6.4 ships per year, [Ref. 3:p. 6].
The drawdown is obviously not over. The current administration along with
Congress believe the Department of the Navy can operate with fewer ships and fewer
people. An assumption must be in place by not only the Government, but by the
American people; they believe the Navy can still maintain the current workload and
deployment schedule ofFY 89, Yet in FY 89 Naval forces were 40 percent larger.
To reduce cost, the United States Navy must examine all variable and fixed costs
associated with the budget. The single largest appropriation for FY 97 is 26.7 percent of
the budget, which is operation and maintenance (O&M). This represents a decrease of
0.7 percent from FY 95. A quick study revealed there are only 159 steaming days funded
out of 365 for a ship on deployment [Ref. 2:p. 2]. Realizing a deployment is 180 days, an
average ship is in the red 21 days, excluding workups and exercises. Since the Navy is
responsible for safeguarding America's interest overseas on a moment's notice, cutting
this appropriation any further seems imprudent.
The next largest appropriation, 23.4 percent of the DoN budget, is the military
personnel active Navy budget, (MPN). While leaders of the Navy and Armed Forces
agree that skilled manpower is the greatest asset in the Department of Defense, some also
believe it can be cut without reducing effectiveness or mission readiness. The Bottom Up
Review, (BUR) of 1993 states DoD must adequately fund the O&M account to maintain
readiness, which in turn will keep forces well-trained and equipped. However, O&M has
already been shown not to be adequately funded under the current administration. The
BUR continues by stating a "key element of maintaining forces ready to fight is to
maintain the quality ofourpeople. . .". This is to be achieved, first, by keeping
personnel highly motivated by treating them fairly and maintaining their quality of life, and
second by only recruiting the most talented young men and women, while expanding
career opportunities for all service members, [Ref. 4:p. 12].
To maintain a highly motivated force by increasing the quality of life requires
decreasing work hours, improving personnel benefits and providing stability for family
members. Ironically, DoN proposes to cut manpower on operational combatants, which
would place more work on individual sailors. However, through new uses of technology,
the Smart Ship initiative is indented to reduce workloads and increase productivity. In this
way the crew would be reduced to where crew members would have the same workload
as before the introduction of technological manpower savers.
It has been implied that Smart Ship will result in billions of dollars saved over the
life cycle of each ship, [Ref. 5]. However, if all the incentives were in-place, including the
service members who were removed from ship being eliminated from active service, and
assuming no additional maintenance costs are required due to the technological add-on's,
then only a maximum savings of 0.54 percent of the annual DoN budget would be saved in
FY96 dollars. This assumes that 1 19 combatants with an average manning of 401
personnel (376 Enlisted, 25 Officer) could reduce their crew by 25%. The analysis also
assumes the 1996 mean annual cost of $75,726 for Officers, and $33,623 for Enlisted,
[Ref. 6:p. 10], for details see Appendix A.
The program will indeed save billions over the long term, but this is only a small
portion of the whole cost of the Navy. Moreover, it is still uncertain how much this will
cost in terms of readiness, training and maintenance. Smart Ship cannot increase the
quality of life for the crew if crew reductions only occur in proportion to workloads saved
by technology. At best, the accomplishment of Smart Ship will keep the quality of life and
moral "constant. Therefore, morale will not increase, retention will not increase and
mission readiness will most likely decay overtime as equipment ages and material
condition worsens.
Following the guidelines ofBUR 1993, DoN should carry out Smart Ship not as a
manpower savings method, but as a combat effectiveness and quality of life improvement
measure, which would indirectly increase morale, productivity, retention and readiness.
Intuitively, if this project was used as a quality of life improvement measure, then DoN
could save an equal amount of budgetary dollars in training, recruitment and material
condition while simultaneously increasing readiness.
B. BACKGROUND
Before the 1970's the cost ofmanpower had been a comparatively small part of the
Navy's annual budget. Then with the advent of the all volunteer force, (AVF), in 1973,
military pay began to rise in an attempt to recruit young Americans with pay equivalent to
the civilian sector. There were no alternatives; pay had to increase to meet the demand of
the force structure required to operate the Department of Defense. However, even with
the increased pay, recruitment continued to be a problem. Many operational units
experienced shortfalls in the mid-level petty officer ranks. These ranks were the ones
which maintained the knowledge base for maintenance and operation throughout the fleet.
By 1980, there was a shortage of some 23,300 Petty Officers, and retention was only 50.5
percent for second termers, [Ref 7:p. 152]. It was not until President Reagan gained
office in 1981 that the military began a slow rebound.
Under President Reagan and the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, the U. S.
Navy began a plan for a 600 ship Navy, [Ref. 8:p. iii]. It was well known that the labor
supply market for 18-24 year olds would decrease approximately 2.2 million by the mid
1980's from the late 1970's, [Ref. 9:p. 9]. Plans were analyzed with the same idea. The
force needed to expand to meet the operational requirements for a 600 ship Navy. Since
there would be fewer young Americans from which to recruit, there needed to be more
efficient ways to use people. Specifically, the Navy had to man more ships, while
increasing operational readiness and constraining the manpower budget.
During the Carter administration, FY 79, there were 458 ships. The total number
of personnel in the United States Navy was 523,937, [Ref. 10:p. 7]. Today, there are 362
ships and 419,599 active forces in the United States Navy, [Ref. 3:p. 32]. The ratio
between total personnel and active ships is 20 percent higher today than at the beginning
of the AVF in 1973, see Figure 2. Technological advances would suggest that the
opposite effect should have occurred with a decreasing ratio ofmanpower per ship over
the past 20 years. Although this is aggregate data, it provides insight on how technology
as a whole has not been used effectively in the United States Navy to reduce manpower
requirements.
The United States Navy is primarily a sea-going organization. Specifically, the
product of the Navy is to provide fully combat ready ships forward deployed. All
personnel in the United States Navy have the same objective; to support the fleet
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Figure 2. Department of the Navy Personnel ratio to total Warships.
ensuring the quality of the product. The 20 percent increase in the ratio of total
manpower per total ships suggests that since the American government requires a similar
OPTEMPO of that in 1989 with fewer ships today, more personnel are required to ensure
success and safety in those operations.
Over the past 30 years, seven administrations have held office with different
objectives and plans for the United States Navy. This has influenced the number of U. S.











Figure 3. Total Active Warships
Ship
In the 1950's the USS Forest Sherman Class, DD 931, required a manning level of
337 men. Displacing 4200 tons, this destroyer conducted ASUW, AAW and ASW. It
used three main guns, four AAW guns, and two missile launchers for Hedge hogs
(ASROC) for ASW or Tarter missiles for AAW, (after conversion), [Ref 11]. Today the
Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer displaces some 8000 tons with an average
manning of 338 men. DDG 51 is armed with 90 vertical launch cells containing AAW
missiles (SM2), ASW weapons (VLA) and strategic strike missiles (Tomahawk-TLAM).
DDG 51 is also equipped with one 5-inch gun (5/54 MK 45-mod 1), a close in weapon
system and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, [Ref. 11].
The differentials between these platforms cannot successfully explain the
differences in ship capabilities. There is no doubt, the DDG 5 1 class is more
technologically advanced than the DD 93 1 class. However, examining the two era's, the
capabilities of these platforms against the capabilities of their foes at the time of their
commissioning, DDG 51 and DD 931 are somewhat equal platforms. It is the author's
assertion that DD 93 1 in its time era of warfare is equal to DDG 5 1 in its time era of
warfare. Therefore, uncertainty arises as to why the difference in displacement.
One of the answers to the differences in displacement is probably because of
improved habitability and quality of life for sailors, [Ref. 7:p. 130]. Another answer
provided by Vice Admiral Walters, DCNO for surface warfare during the FY 84
congressional budget hearings was "Extra space is built into ships to provide for mid-life
upgrades" [Ref. 7:p. 135].
During other congressional hearings on the increased size ofNavy ships, analysis
was pointed out that the US Navy had to operate in high and rough seas, forward
deployed, for substantial periods. It was also determined that complex, shipboard systems
accounted for most of the shipboard life cycle cost, not hull size. The reasoning for this
was based on how fast these complex systems became obsolete. Hull life, however, was
still at 30 plus years. Therefore, hull size was pointed out to be critical in the flexibility of
updating systems with more sophisticated and technologically advanced weapon systems
[Ref 7:pp. 134-135].
Admiral Boorda realized manpower was not being used effectively throughout the
fleet. "For my entire thirty-nine year career, we always talked about buying ships and
manning them with people ... I think we need to think about things differently now. We
need to figure out how to have the fewest number of people possible, and then build
[ships] to make them as effective as they need to be", [Ref. 12:p. 21]. After the
completion of a study by the Naval Research Advisory Committee, Admiral Boorda
requested a test platform to examine and validate recommendations for manpower
reductions on a surface combatant [Ref. 12:p. 83].
The Smart Ship project was initiated, and hundreds of technological ideas were
forwarded to Washington to reduce manpower. Many focused on the procedures of the
merchant fleet. However, the most crucial and realistic ones were occurring under the
direction of the Commanding Officer ofthe USS Yorktown, (CG 48). It was in the
interest of the Commanding Officer of the USS Yorktown to ensure he could still fight the
ship, while not increasing the already extensive workload for his crew.
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C. OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this study is to analyze the cost and benefits of Smart Ship, and
reduced manning through the uses of technology, as it pertains to mission readiness. The
primary question the study will address is:
Is Smart Ship cost effective? More specifically:
1. Will the reduction of crew members as a result of Smart ship worsen material
readiness, decrease crew moral and overall affect the readiness of the future fleet?
2. Does the current Smart Ship objective indicate the way for the Navy to operate
in the 2 1st century?
3. Has technology reduced the manpower requirements for U.S. Naval
Combatants over the past century?
4. If technology has not significantly reduced manpower, than what is the major
factor in the reduction ofmanpower for U.S. Naval Combatants?
5. Can the United States Navy depend on technology to reduce manpower in the
future?
6. In what ways has the Navy benefited from technology?
7. Is the fleet of today in its era of technology equal to the fleet in the mid 1950's
in its era of technology, holding all else constant? (i.e. Does the Navy have a more
strategic offensive and defensive capability today than we did 45 years ago?)
8. What alternatives are available for current Naval leaders to reduce Navy
manpower?
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D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This study will focus on the Smart Ship project in place on USS Yorktown,
(CG 48). It will cover the impact of reduced manning on mission readiness by examining
the Smart Ship project, and other major surface combatants over the past 30 years.
Analysis on cost savings will be conducted for the project to determine if Smart Ship is the
best alternative to pursue. The thesis will also provide recommendations on how to assess
the accomplishments of the project after the completion ofUSS Yorktown' s deployment
in the spring of 1997. Background studies on Destroyer, Cruiser, and Frigate class ships
will provide insights on how the Navy can maintain readiness.
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis will include five Chapters. Chapter I defines the problem, and provides
background information. Chapter II will include various background studies on measuring
ship productivity, material readiness and material condition. The Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA), has studied manpower and the relationship with ship productivity for
more than twenty years. Other information in this chapter will make the reader aware of
basic labor economics and the substitution of capital for labor.
Chapter III will present the new theory of Smart Ship. It will contain current
objectives, progress and future goals for the program and USS Yorktown. This chapter
will also provide information on the capabilities of USS Yorktown and her current and
future mission responsibilities.
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Chapter IV will discuss analysis on the cost and benefits of Smart Ship. This
chapter will provide analysis from previous studies of readiness. Facts of Smart Ship will
be based from interviews on board with the Commanding Officer, the crew of the USS
Yorktown, the Smart Ship Project^ (SSP) office, and from reports in the media and
Internet, the Naval Research Advisory Committee and presentations from Captain Barker,
USN, SSP team.
Chapter V will contain conclusions on the cost and benefits associated with the
current program of Smart Ship, along with options identified by the cost benefit analysis
(CBA). Recommendations will include modifications to the current program's objectives
and identify some precautions in the assessment of the program. Insight on the manning
of future combatants, including the SC 21 and Arsenal ship will be provided. Areas of






The United States Navy has been criticized for not using available shipboard
technology to reduce manpower on today's combatants. This is primarily due to culture,
tradition, and policy. There have been few incentives for the Navy to change. This past
century has proven a well prepared Navy and National defense is needed in safe guarding
America's interest, both domestic and abroad.
Smart Ship tears down the walls of culture, tradition and policy, [Ref 5]. It
provides the Navy with real time thinking and solutions for manpower reduction on
surface combatants. However, limited analysis has been conducted into the material
readiness cost associated with reduced manning
Smart Ship provides clear answers for reduction in shipboard operation and
control. It uses common sense approaches, along with "off the shelf' technology to
reduce manning requirements for watch stations. However, it does not provide for the
unscheduled, corrective maintenance and emergent repair that is familiar to any sailor.
Therefore, it is uncertain if the reduction of crew members will result in worsened material
condition, decreased moraTand overall affect the readiness of the fleet.
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B. SHIPBOARD READINESS
"Ships are complex, and because many equipment failures are random or from
unidentified causes, even identifying average systematic linkages between ship material
condition and resources available to the ship has been difficult...", [Ref. 13 :p. 1].
Measuring readiness for surface combatants is extremely difficult. There are no
quantifiable numbers or scales to evaluate individual units or battlegroups. Instead,
readiness is evaluated at certain intervals through different departments over training
cycles. Nothing is consistent nor concrete between platforms or inspections. Rather, it is
a relative ranking from opinion, experience and minimum requirements. If a ship meets all
of the minimum requirements, then it is presumed ready to deploy. As all sailors know,
some ships are more ready than others.
Despite many attempts at some stronger indicators over the years, there are no
solid measures for readiness. Factors considered often include the number of outstanding
casualty reports, (CASREPs *), the time required to repair the casualty, the level of
readiness on the Status of Resources and Training (SORTs2) report, and individual grades
on departmental examinations, assessments, and certifications. However, the bottom line
for a ship being ready is being on station, on time, performing its mission as designed.
1 CASREPs are submitted to area commanders reporting degradations in mission capability. They
are organized in categories ofCAT 2, CAT 3 and CAT 4. CAT 4 is the most serious degradation to a
primary mission area. CAT 2 is a minor degradation to either a primary or secondary mission area which
requires only simply parts to fix. Supply information is provided with these reports to provide parts as soon
as possible.
SORTs is a message submitted to the Joint Chiefs updating shipboard readiness. Some of the
categories are material condition (CASREPs), personnel, fuel and ammo.
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Deploying CASREP free is a milestone for every ship to achieve. This is one
indicator of a highly maintained ship with the highest levels of material readiness. This is
also an indicator of the correct resources and manpower aboard to repair casualties.
Three studies at CNA, which examined combatant readiness by analyzing CASREP data
demonstrate complex and technological equipment requires highly skilled technicians to
maintain it. Specifically, these studies provide statistical evidence that highly skilled labor
used in challenging jobs result is less CASREPs per ship.
The first two studies, both by Horowitz (1977) broke out equipment systems into
subsystems listed in Table 2. By breaking up systems to identify ratings responsible for
Table 2. Horowitz and Sherman's subsystems and ratings responsible for maintenance
and upkeep.
Subsystem Associated Rating
Boilers Boiler Technician (BT)
Engines Machinist's Mate (MM)
Gun Systems Fire Control Technician (FT)
Gunner's Mate (GM)
Missile Systems Fire Control Technician (FT)
Gunner's Mate (GM)
ASW Systems Gunner's Mate (GM)
Sonar Technician (ST)
Torpedoman's Mate (TM)
Sonars Sonar Technician (ST)
Source: Horowitz, Stanley A. and Sherman, Allan, Crew Characteristics and Ship Condition , p. 2, Center for
Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, March 1977.
Note: FT has become FC, GM has divided mto GMG, and GMM and ST has become STG.
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maintenance and repair, Horowitz believed he could determine which rates were more
productive. Therefore, if a subsystem experienced less CASREP downtime, the
individuals responsible for the equipment were presumed higher skilled and more
productive, relative to their counterparts. While this may be a less than comprehensive
approach, it is interesting and provides insight. It allowed Horowitz to identify key
personal attributes, including being single and a high school diploma graduate^(HSDG) as
positively correlated to increased shipboard readiness.
The most statistically significant factors associated with readiness were high skilled
technicians. High skilled technicians were categorized as HSDG. If a HSDG was placed
in a technical rating, CASREP downtime decreased, implying increased productivity.
However, if these individuals received non-technical assignments, their subsystems had
higher CASREP downtime, implying decreased productivity,
[Ref 14:p. 3].
Quester, (1989) demonstrated that higher skilled sailors, along with lower rates in
crew turnover and increased steaming hours underway resulted in less CASREPs per ship.
Quester studied three different ship classes. The Knox class frigate, the Adams class
guided missile destroyer and the Spruance class destroyer. She showed that quality
personnel, decreased crew turnover and OPTEMPO were statistically significant in
increasing material condition and shipboard readiness.
18
1. Personnel
Higher skilled entrants have longed been desired by the military since the AVF, in
1973. To attract these individuals requires competitive wages and opportunity for them to
excel, [Ref. 15:p. 1]. To keep such individuals requires more. People must feel
challenged and wanted. Trust and confidence also play a part in wanting to stay at an
organization. However, one of the most important feelings that affects an individual's
commitment is stability. Stability is not only in having a job and a pay check next month,
but stability is being in the same city for more than 24 months and time spent with ones
family.
The military has always been a hard way of life for a service member with a family.
The constant deployments, training, and uncertainty ofworld events creates feelings of
discontent towards the military, and a wanting to get out. In years past, the factors of
retirement and benefits earned from a 20 year commitment were more valuable and
persuasive than today. Today's sailors are required to deploy more, and do more than
those years ago in order to maintain the readiness of the fleet. Even inport periods, which
used to provide families with valuable reunion time, are now burdened with maintenance,
repair, preparation, training, inspections and preservation, all in attempt to maintain high
standard fleet readiness.
If the Navy wants to keep these valuable, highly skilled workers, then it must make
a commitment to them. The Navy needs to increase the quality of life for all of its




Crew turnover has long been a problem in the Navy. To improve readiness,
Quester recommends reducing crew turnover in the months before deployment. The
problem associated with this is too many sailors want off sea duty for reasons listed in
section 1. In addition, some of the current problems experienced today are directly
associated with the poor management of personnel in the Navy by BUPERS. For
example, all Navy personnel are assigned prospective rotation dates, (PRDs) and an end of
active obligated service, (EAOS). The problem does not exist for first termers, because
the dates are the same. However, when sailors reenlist, they are assigned a new EAOS.
Then, later when they receive orders to a command, for example a ship, they receive a
PRD. The PRD is usually 2 years further out than the EAOS. The problem exist when at
the EAOS, the sailor has up until the eleventh hour to decide if he or she will reenlist. If
the sailor stays, then there is no problem. However, if the sailor decides to get out, the
command now is confronted with a gapped billet until filled. The billet is usually filled
with a first termer, with less experience and knowledge then the second termer who left.
This in turn creates turbulence for all in the work center and division, [Ref. 16:p. 20].
BUPERS may argue that this is unavoidable. They might suggest a command
could use better management in determining if someone will reenlist or get out. While in
some instances this may be true, it is not guaranteed for all. For a command to guarantee
a fill as soon as possible, it would need to adjust the PRD to the EAOS. Then, if the
member decided to stay in the Navy, an extension would be required or else the command
would lose the member, along with the experience base.
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If a command suffers from such a gap, then it will go into a queue of fills
depending on urgency. The most urgent billets to fill are those commands in a deploying
status. This in turn denies commands the ability to receive crew members early enough to
train and acquaint them to the rest of the ship.
Training personnel on combatants requires repetitive instruction and drills to attain
proficiency and productivity. Training time is a constraint dictated by maintenance and
allowed steaming hours. Steaming hours as mentioned in the introduction have been cut
to 159 days for a deploying ship.
Other problems in crew turnover have further increased with Admiral Boorda's
new policy for division officers, DIVO. The old policy kept division officers at a
command up to 36 months. Then, usually a DIVO did a follow on tour for 18 months on
another platform. During the first tour, a DIVO would obtain qualifications and
experience as a manager. The DIVO would also gain knowledge of his or her equipment
and how to conduct business in the fleet. The policy now in effect limits DIVO time for a
command to 24 months. It is the duty of the first command to ensure the DIVO has a
qualification pin as a Surface Warfare Officer and limited knowledge to prepare him or her
for their next 24 month assignment as a DIVO aboard another, different type of ship.
This policy requires a command to train more DIVO's than before, adding to the already
full work day and creating more crew turbulence.
Studies prove that a crew that trains together and remains together is far more
ready then the high crew turnover commands the Navy policy is creating. If Smart ship is
to happen, a major obstacle will be in keeping highly skilled workers aboard longer,
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eliminating the high turn over rates. If a ship is to be effective with less crew members,
than they must be fully trained before they arrive, stay for longer periods, and detach only
when a replacement is competent to perform the task.
3. OPTEMPO
The third significant variable Quester studied which affected readiness was
increased steaming hours. It seems common sense for any sailor that the more time spent
together training underway would result in higher material readiness. This underway time
helps work out any "bugs" in equipment and personnel. It also allows personnel to be
away from the influences of home and to keep their mind on the job. The draw back to
this is when inport, crew members must be given a routine which allows for stability.
Quester discovered that those commands which did not commit to a constant, routine
workup prior to deployment, by pushing all underway time into the quarter before,
resulted in worsen material readiness.
4. Other Readiness Factors
While each ship class was studied independent of the other three, examining the
predicted average percent time free ofCAT 3 and CAT 4 CASREPs provides insight that
technology may be an equalizing factor for lesser quality sailors. Specifically, Table 3
shows that higher quality sailors increase the percent ofCASREP free days. These are the
number of days during the month that a combatant is free ofCAT 3 and CAT 4
CASREPs. Table 3 shows that for individuals one percentage point below the mean for
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Table 3. Predicted Average Percent Time Free of Mission Degrading C3/C4 CASREPs
Knox Adams Spruance
class class class
Predicted for means of all variables 68.5 51.9 70.2
Changes from overall mean prediction
when QUAL_MAN is
One percentage point above mean 70.4 55.2 70.7
One percentage point below mean 66.5 48.6 69.7
Source: Ouester. Aline 0.. Enlisted Crew Quality and Ship Material Readiness, p. 7, April 1989.
the variable QUAL_MAN, Quester's quality variable, decrease the percent ofCASREP
free days. However, the Spruance class destroyer only decreases .5 percent, while the
other two less sophisticated combatant types decrease 4 to 10 percent. Based on that
data, technology maybe an equalizing factor for lesser skilled personnel.
Ship age and equipment reliability may also play a factor in these results. This is
verified by Horowitz who found that equipment reliability for engineering plants was
dependent upon overall age and the reliability for weapon systems was dependent upon
the length of the time interval between overall periods, [Ref. 17:p. 13].
Material readiness can be an indicator of qualified, trained personnel onboard to
maintain and repair equipment. However, there are other factors which have been
mentioned that bias the results. Therefore mission readiness cannot be determined solely
by CASREP data.
Another indicator of readiness is how fully trained and proficient a crew is. By
examining SORTS data, CNA, (Center for Naval Analyses), determined variables which
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increased a combatants ability to deploy fully combat ready. A list of the significant
variables are listed in Table 4.
Table 4. Description of variables and data sources used in Quester and Marcus logit
model.








Training readiness was C 1 when the
ship deployed
Enlisted manning relative to M+l
manning requirements3
Percent of enlisted crew new to the ship
in the three months prior to deployment
Percent of enlisted crew in engineering
ratings new to the ship in the six months
before deployment
Value of 1 if ship in Pacific Fleet
Year deployed
Total of C3 or C4 CASREP days in the six
months before deployment. For example,
two outstanding C3 or C4 CASREPs for an





tapes and billet file data
DMDC UIC manning data






MSO Months since overhaul for ships except
FFG-7s. Because FFG-7s do not have
overhauls, MSO is defined as months
since C5 status.
Ship Employment History
File and SORTS data
3 MANREQ is defined as a measure of the ship's enlisted manning relative to the
requirements. However, it is not simply a count of enlisted manning relative to the requirements.
It is a function which encompasses the mix of paygrades to include the different levels of
productivity in levels of paygrades. The assumption is higher paygrades are more productive.
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Table 4. (Continued)
Variable Description Data source
SUBSEQUENT_DEPLOY
AVG SHU
Control variable with value of 1 for a
deployment that is not the first since
an overhaul
Monthly average of steaming hours











Monthly average of steaming hours
not underway in the six months before
deployment
Steaming hours underway in the month
before deployment
Average proportion of days underway in
the six months before deployment
Proportion of days underway in the month
before deployment
Ship Fuel and Hours
data






Source: Quester and Marcus, How OPTEMPO. Crew Turnover, and Material Condition Affect the Training
Readiness of Surface Combatants, pp. 4-5., March 1989.
One of the most statistically significant variables for decreasing the probability of
deploying C 1 in training was PNEW3 . This variable, which identifies crew turnover,
decreases the probability of deploying CI when crew turnover occurs in the quarter before
deployment. The effect, while not statistically significant, was negative even if crew
turnover occurred two to three quarters before a deployment. The variable provides
interesting evidence that crews should spend a maximum amount of time together by
decreasing the amount of turnover per quarter and extending time onboard. A change in
routine would be required if sea duty was expanded. The change would need to include a
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decrease in the intense work hours which have been known to wear down sailors and
decrease their productivity.
Another significant variable listed in Table 4, related to manpower is MANREQ.
A function which accounts for the mix in paygrades to include the productivity levels, (El-
E9), MANREQ assumes the higher the paygrade the higher the productivity. See
Appendix D.
The variable MANREQ is the ratio of the sum of the basic pay of enlisted
personnel currently on board (COB) divided by the basic pay of personnel required as
M+l
.
MANREQ indicates the higher the ratio, or the closer COB was to M+l, the higher
the probability a combatant had of deploying CI, or fully combat ready. The CNA study
also found that the more people a command had, the better its chances in deploying fully
combat ready. This cast doubt on Smart Ship's efforts toward reduced manning.
Another variable consistent with training is OPTEMPO. CNA showed that
increased operating schedules and underway steaming at a steady pace over several
quarters before a deployment resulted in a higher probability of deploying C 1 . However,
if a ship attempted to increase OPTEMPO in the last quarter before the deployment as in a
"catch up pattern" then the results proved a strong negative effect in the probability of
deploying CI, [Ref 18:p. 16], see Table 5. The study verifies the earlier work of Quester
(1989) using CASREP data.
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Table 5. Estimated historical effect of changes in independent variables on the likelihood
of deploying CI in training, as discovered by Quester and Marcus
Change in independent variable
Effect on likelihood of
deploying CI in training
Decrease NEW_ENG6 by 2 percentage points
Decrease C3/C4 CASDAYs in six months
before deployment by 25 CASDAYs
OPTEMPO
Increase AVG_SHU by ten hours
Increase AVG_UND by 1 percent
.83 to .86 percentage point increase
.71 to .83 percentage point increase
.77 to .79 percentage point increase
.86 to .91 percentage point increase
Source: Quester and Marcus, How OPTEMPO. Crew Turnover, and Material Condition affect the Training
Readiness of Surface Combatants , p. 17. March 1989.
Note: CASDAYs are defined as the number of days in a 30 day period (1 month) with CAT 3 and CAT 4
CASREPS. The dependent variable for Quester and Marcus's equation.
C. WEAPON SYSTEM ADVANCES
The past twenty years have produced many technical developments for weapon
and engineering systems. These developments have greatly improved combat
effectiveness and responsiveness. Automation in gun mounts is one example of this
technology. However, is the increasing cost ofmanpower the incentive for the advanced
technology and automation? Specifically, was the automated gun designed for manpower
savings, or was it designed to provide a tactical advantage in the war fighting arena?
Another development in weapon systems provided combatants with missiles.
These missile systems proved to be more tactically beneficial than the automated gun.
They provided combatants with longer ranges of offensive and defensive fire power.
While missile systems have traditionally not required as many persons to operate as gun
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systems, the maintenance required was labor intensive. Specifically, the systems launchers
required many hours of preventive maintenance to ensure smooth operation, until the
1980's when vertical launching systems, (VLS), became feasible. The commissioning of
the USS Bunker Hill, (CG 52) proved that a ship could be more versatile with VLS and
less manpower intensive. VLS would require little if any maintenance. However, because
the Bunker Hill was a Ticonderoga class cruiser, she received a similar complement in
crew as the other ships in the class. Manpower savings was not the incentive for VLS.
Tactical advantage was gained with the capability of over thirty more missiles including
the new tomahawk cruise missile.
Radar systems have also advanced over time. However, while the systems have
definitely become more capable, they have become more costly to maintain. Maintenance
hours is just one facet in these system's increased cost.
Most advanced systems have provided combatants with an introduction into the
information technology, (IT) arena. IT is one of the tactical benefits gained by the
advanced radar system identified as AEGIS. This system, first utilized by the Ticonderoga
class cruisers, provides symbology on large screen displays and operator consoles for
quick tactical decision making. The AEGIS display system (ADS), is the cornerstone of
IT management for these combatants. Having this automated capability with human
interface has allowed a significant reduction in operators and response time. However,
this interface has not been fully be utilized for manpower savings. Its main purpose was
tactical.
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D. ENGINEERING SYSTEM ADVANCES
The most significant reduction in manpower from engineering systems has been
derived from gas turbine marine, GTM, engines. By using GTM's to power combatants,
manning reductions have been possible. However, was manpower reduction the focus of
the implementation? GTMs provides surface combatants with an operational advantage.
Specifically, the GTM only requires minutes to align and start provided lube oil supporting
systems and fuel oil systems are operating at specific temperatures in accordance with
EOSS, engineering operating sequencing systems. This advancement makes the fleet
more mobile and responsive. Other advantages include lower fuel consumption and less
acoustically detectable operations.
E. PAST POLICY ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE MANNING
Reduced manning is not a new goal. As mentioned, the Navy has benefited from
indirect reduced manning in weapon systems and engineering. The Navy on several
occasions has attempted to benefit directly from reduced manning. Three of these
attempts occurred in the 1970's. Two were in the construction of new platforms, the
Spruance class destroyer, DD 963 and the Oliver Hazard Perry guided missile frigate,
FFG 7. The third was in a program similar to Smart Ship today, implemented on the test
ship USS McCandless, FF 1084, during the period ofNovember 1976 to January 1977,
[Ref 19:p. 19].
In the development of the DD 963 class, roughly 225 crew members were
originally assigned. The manning requirements were based on a task analysis of
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maintenance and watch standing requirements. However, the Navy quickly realized how
minimally armed the warship was, and devised ways to improve its combat power. In
addition, the crew had to be increased to meet maintenance requirements and shipboard
training. As a result the present compliment is approximately 325-350.
The Oliver Hazard Perry class was designed under the concept entitled high mix,
low mix. This strategy envisioned the need for highly capable and high cost cruisers and
destroyers to serve in areas of severe enemy threat, while less capable, less costly frigates
served in areas of low enemy threat. As a result, the low mix ships received less attention
in material condition and maintenance from shore facilities. Crew size was not large
enough to complete repairs alone, and combat readiness decreased, [Ref. 20: p. 93].
The ship control function has been viewed by many as an overmanned requirement
for decades. Both tradition and decreased training opportunities have continued bridge
manning of over 10 members per watch. Therefore, manpower is diverted from other
tasks, such as maintenance and administration, in an attempt to keep ship control
personnel trained. The integrated bridge system (IBS), a significant part of Smart Ship
technology, was evaluated aboard USS McCandless for a period of 3 months. It proved
that watchstanding manning requirements could be reduced. However, it was not seen as
cost effective by Navy leadership. Specifically, there was a higher priority for weapon and
sensor development and acquisition, [Ref. 19:p. 20].
Other technological improvements which had the potential to reduce manpower
included a study by Purdue University in the 1 960's, funded through the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The study's purpose was to evaluate the possibility
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of automating several processes aboard destroyer escorts in an effort to reduce manning
requirements. The Purdue University study offered a solution which included adding
computer technology aboard for the time. However, the proposal was determined not to
be cost effective because the reductions in crew members occurred only in the lower





Operating cost in the Navy are continuing to increase. As the defense budget
continues to shrink from Congressional pressure, the Navy is required to reduce spending
and cut overhead. The new era of thinking is to have Navy operate like corporate
America, (e.g. to become more efficient and effective).
For years the Navy has been extremely effective, with some efficiency. However,
for the Navy to operate effectively requires lots of money. Arguably with increased
efficiency will come decreased effectiveness. Congress along with Navy leadership must
decide what levels are acceptable.
For the Navy to meet these objectives of efficiency and effectiveness, it must
identify and review all fixed and variable cost associated with the budget. One of these
costs, manpower, is presently the most vulnerable to being cut. However, past experience
shows that fleet manpower reductions have failed not only due to the factors of culture,
tradition and policies, but because of decreased mission readiness (e.g. effectiveness).
One of the reasons for MPN's vulnerability is the underlying assumption in the
fleet that manpower is free. Specifically, if a body was available, it was used, no matter
how impractical, or inefficient the job was. However, that same body could also be part
of a major action hours later which could save lives, equipment or the entire ship.
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B. THE CATALYST
The Naval Research Advisory Committee submitted a report to Admiral Boorda,
Chief ofNaval Operations 1994-1996, on possible solutions that could reduce workload
and manning requirements aboard surface combatants. The report revealed no specific
laws, with the exception of a posted lookout, which required the number of sailors Navy
ships must maintain. The panel suggested the Navy shift its focus from using technology
as a tactical and operational benefit to using technology as a means to reduce manpower
by improving personnel productivity.
USS Yorktown was nominated and approved to be the experimental ship in
November 1995. Prior to Yorktown 's approval, it was assigned to a new homeport and a
battlegroup in the Gulf of Mexico. This battlegroup is specifically designed to deploy for
only four to five months in the Caribbean to deter and track drug operations off the coast
of South America.
C. SMART SHIP PROJECT OVERVIEW
The Smart Ship Project (SSP) was created to cut through bureaucratic and cultural
obstacles in the implementation of innovative new ideas for current and future surface
ships in the US Navy. [Ref. 5]. Smart Ship is referred to as the vanguard of cultural
revolution in the Navy, challenging corporate thinking on shipboard manning issues. A
team for Smart Ship was developed from fleet organizations across the Navy in an attempt
to change the way the Navy outfits and mans ships. However, a primary goal besides cost
effectiveness was to reduce the shipboard work load. The directives the team received
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from Admiral Boorda were to challenge policy, culture, and tradition which contributed to
unproductive workload. Boorda also tasked them to incorporate modern and current
technology which could minimized human interface and improve productivity.
As part of the new technology, USS Yorktown will receive a fiber optic local area
network (LAN), an integrated bridge system, (IBS), a damage control system, (DCS), an
integrated condition assessment system, (ICAS) and a standard monitoring and control
system, (SMCS). The tactical action officer, TAO, will control all ship functions from
CIC. A fully qualified officer of the deck will be stationed on the bridge along with three
personnel to ensure safe navigation, [Ref 6].
By implementing Smart Ship on all available platforms, the MPN savings would be
in the billions of dollars over a life cycle of a ship for all affected combatants. However,
would this savings be outweighed by the lack of effectiveness that might result? While
MPN would gain savings, O&M along with other appropriations may suffer.
D. USS YORKTOWN PROGRESS
After selection USS Yorktown made swift changes to its watch bill without any
technological improvements. USS Yorktown adjusted its watch bill underway from 140
men to 77 men, [Ref. 22]. Further watch bill modifications were made by determining
these 77 crew members as the "core watch team". If additional personnel were required
for special operations such as sea and anchor or underway replenishment, or flight
operations, then a support team already designated, the "flex team", would augment the
watchstanding core for the evolution. If crew members were not part of these two teams,
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they were designated to be "day workers". As an incentive for the day workers to qualify
and stand watch, core watch members only stand watch and are not required to perform
the daily maintenance and routine duties that most sailors are familiar with.
The damage control and general quarters procedures were also changed. General
quarters was eliminated. Condition three watchstanders in the core would fight the ship.
If a casualty occurred, then damage control quarters would be called away. While the
core maintained the watch, a large flex team of 61 crew members would man repair
lockers and CCS, (central control station) to conduct damage and casualty control4 . All
other crew members on Yorktown would report either to the helo hanger or foc'sle on
standby. Condition Zebra would be set as needed and directed, [Ref. 23].
Engineering spaces will be unmanned, as first designed in the 1970's. There will
be safeguards which include monitors and sensors throughout the plant to ensure safe
steaming, and to protect the ship from major leaks and fires. An Engineering Officer of
the Watch, (EOOW) along with two other personnel will stand watch in CCS as a backup.
Primary control of engineering will however, be in CIC. When all is complete, 5.8 million
dollars of technology will be added, with a maximum reduction of 25 percent in crew.
This is all in an attempt to reduce the largest input to ship life cycle cost, manpower.
4
Currently on other Ticonderoga class cruisers, 125 crew members man repair and casualty control
stations at GQ.
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E. SMART SHIP TRAINING
Yorktown is equipped with the most modern of training rooms in the Surface
Warfare community. This provides an atmosphere for training and an enthusiasm to get
away from normal daily routines and to actually train. Future plans are being developed to
include video tele-conferencing, (VTC) and video tele-training, (VTT), so as to provide
training support when deployed.
A training department is also being established with sole responsibility of
administrative records, watch bill scheduling and operational training. The department will
be chaired by a senior department head, to ensure proper supervision. These procedures are




IV. COST AND BENEFITS OF SMART SHIP
A. INTRODUCTION
Smart Ship does not provide the big dollar savings the Navy requires. Only one half
of one percent (e.g. 0.54%) of the total DoN budget per year would be saved if and only if
every sailor who was removed from their command was terminated from active service.
See Appendix A. This savings does not provide for any increased maintenance cost over
the current repair budget. This seems risky and imprudent. The Navy could not
significantly benefit from reduced manning on platforms all ready in service. It would be
better off to use this technology as a combat effectiveness and quality of life measure.
B. THE COST
Decreased manpower has been shown in chapter II to decrease material condition
and mission readiness. Material condition is a cornerstone to readiness, as are so many
other factors. When material condition decreases, these other factors also experience
decreases, for instance, retention, morale, satisfaction with military life and sailor
productivity. These factors all represent some unpredicted cost. With decreased material
condition, more ships may experience the inability to operate fully ready and safely, thereby
placing an added operational burden on other units.
The Navy will not experience another buildup in the near future, especially in these
times of budgetary cuts. Therefore, the number of ships will continue to diminish. Some
predictions anticipate 290 active warships by 2000, [Ref. 2:p. 2.]. Less ships means more
39
underway time, therefore less inport maintenance time. By having less people to conduct
maintenance at sea, the Navy will most likely experience further shortfalls in readiness.
Technology cannot fully correct this.
C. BENEFITS AND ALTERNATIVES
Smart Ship provides solutions to reduce ship life cycle cost. When fully
implemented on all available ships, billions of dollars will be saved over the long run in life
cycle cost. But at what cost, and what other alternatives are available? Cannot manpower
reductions be taken in less risky environments, like shore billets? As briefed by RADM
Loeffler, (MPTA sponsor), and confirmed by LCDR Hoskins at NAVMAC, shore billets
have not been reduced as drastically as sea billets, [Ref. 24]. It would seem that the CGs
and DDGs as our first-line combatants ought to be the last place to make manpower
reductions.
Command and control, C 2
,
are vital in combat. C 2 technology, which is the
cornerstone of Smart Ship, provides better command and control performance.
Furthermore, it seems if this technology were utilized to supplement the crew rotation of
operation and watch standing, more time could be devoted to material condition, training,
professional qualifications, advancement opportunities including educational courses and in-
rate training, and free time for personnel just to relax. The indirect savings from enhanced
retention, reduced attrition and training cost along with improved material readiness might
far outweigh any savings from Smart Ship.
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Yes, manpower costs can be reduced in the United States Navy. This can be
accomplished with recommendations similar to those of the early 1980's, when the DoN
was looking for more personnel. The concept is to use people more efficiently, so there are
more people to man ships. The potential savings from crew stability - keeping enlisted and
officer manpower in place longer - has yet to be realized. This combined with the benefits
discussed in studies conducted by CNA, would greatly enhance today's Navy.
D. ALTERNATIVE MANPOWER REDUCTION METHODS
Also indicated in past studies, CO time onboard along with crew turnover are
significant variables in mission readiness. According to a study conducted by the
Congressional Budget Office at the time of a 600 ship Navy, if sea tours were lengthened
three months and shore tours shortened by three months for only half of the enlisted force,
then after three years of implementation 14,500 fewer personnel would be required. [Ref.
8: p. 31]. Applying this same logic today would emphasize the reduction of shore billets,
not sea billets. Shore billets have remained relatively constant in size since 1989, [Ref. 24].
Ifwe adjusted for the force size today, using an average ratio of 1 ship per 1000 personnel,
(aggregate number includes ship manning and shore manning combined, see Figure 2), as
implied in the CBO report of 1983 (600 ships, 600,000 personnel), then Navy manpower
could be reduced 62,500 to a total of 362,000 end strength, using 1996 data. This
reduction would be primarily focused on shore billets. If the ratio of total ship to total
personnel is justified, a $2.5 billion savings could be achieved each year, five times the
savings of Smart Ship.
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Another alternative is possible. The data in chapter II indicates that cutting the
number of ships though controversial, may be better than cutting the number ofbodies
required to operate them. This is because better material condition and readiness are highly
correlated with larger crews, [Ref. 13]. It would seem that if the DoN is going to reduce its
fleet to the proposed 346, a number not seen in over 50 years, then those ships ought to be
maintained at a very high state of readiness. Ships will no longer be allowed to "just get
by". They will be required to perform with infrequent overhauls and inport periods. Poor
material readiness will lead to more breakdowns and ships not being able to get underway
Adequate manning is the best hope of maintaining readiness. The Navy is likely to have
ship strength reduced as an action beyond its control. The most prudent course of action
would be to ensure that the ships remaining in service are at peak operational readiness for
deployment and combat.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis favors Smart Ship experimentation. This is the only way the Navy can
excel; by challenging its culture. It also favors exploiting technology to improve labor
productivity. It is essential that this new technology be proven sound and reliable. If it is
not, then it will not be trusted by the sailors. If it is not trusted, then it will not be used as
designed. Examples of this can be seen in the engineering plants of the Spruance and
Ticonderoga class ships.
However, ifDoN is interested in saving manpower dollars in the MPN budget,
Smart Ship is not the best solution. While Smart Ship has the potential of saving 0.54
percent of the total DoN budget, this would risk the readiness of the fleet. It is possible
that Smart Ship would be able to adapt to the circumstances of reduced manning in the
short term. The risk is in the long run: the possibility of having lesser qualified personnel,
higher CASREP rates and lower crew moral leading to lower fleet readiness.
If the product of the peacetime Navy is its ships on station, forward deployed and
ready to perform their mission at a moments notice, the current goals of Smart Ship will
decrease the quality of the product. I believe the entire Navy is involved in supplying the
product, (e.g. ships being ready). If this is true, it is not prudent to risk having a lesser
product at a fraction of a percent in savings. IfMPN costs need to be reduced, then the
entire department responsible for the product must be evaluated (e.g. the Navy). I believe
when the Navy does this, they will realize that there is still a lot of "fat" which can be
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reduced on shore. It seems logical to reduce the overhead cost of the product first, then
to reduce the quality of the product.
Nevertheless, Smart Ship experimentation will help the Navy. This new thinking
and technology will aid in the development of the SC 21 and the Arsenal ship. It will also
provide operational commands with better ways of using manpower. However, the Navy
must be extremely careful in any analysis from the Smart Ship assessment, due to the
Hawthorne effect (which showed that good people try to make new ideas, even unsound
ones, succeed), the Navy could be easily mislead. To truly evaluate this program would
require many years and many crew rotations.
I believe if the Navy wants to excel in readiness, than the current program should
be used as a combat effectiveness and quality of life improvement measure. Though this
thesis offers no proof, I believe the money saved from having higher retention rates in
ships more self sufficient and with crews happier on sea duty will far outweigh the money
that could be saved under the current program, and without the risk of decreased
readiness.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Smart Ship has the potential of saving budgetary dollars, while increasing the
potential combat effectiveness and mission readiness of the fleet. However, under the
current plan, the costs saved do not outweigh the benefits of a fully manned combatant.
By modifying the current program higher readiness could be achieved.
The first action which could be carried out by the Navy is a fleet wide order
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instructing all unit commanders to implement the watch bill recommendations invented by
the USS Yorktown. The ideas and concepts tested on the USS Yorktown are common
sense approaches which allow trust in watchstanders and equipment. These concepts free
up personnel which makes them available to maintain and repair equipment, clean and
preserve shipboard areas and train and supervise subordinates.
The second step for the Navy would be to install the new Smart Ship technology
and information technology aboard all surface combatants. The newer the platform, the
more cost effective the procedure would be. In turn, this would directly increase the
combat effectiveness and possible mission readiness of each and every combatant over
time.
Combat effectiveness would be increased due to the increased command and
control gained by centralizing all shipboard control and operating equipment. The
Commanding Officer would have steering control, propulsion control along with weapon
control in the combat information center, (CIC). All of the systems would have reliable
back ups. Specifically, they would be backed up by the way the fleet operates today, with
personnel in central control station, (CCS) and on the bridge.
I also recommend that crew turnover be reduced. This would require sea duty to
be lengthened. To determine the optimum time aboard and cost effectiveness would
require the work of another thesis. However, if quality of life was improved aboard ships,
sea duty could be extended without drastic negative effects. A by-product of this
recommendation would be increased sea pay to off-set any negative effects of longer sea
duty.
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Current total Navy manpower could be reduced following the guidelines in the
1983 CBO report on the implantation of a 600 ship Navy to increase the sea to shore ratio
by eliminating shore billets. The principle is the same today. Shore commands have not
adjusted to the draw down like the sea going, operational commands.
To reduce manpower in the future, while maintaining readiness, new warships
must be designed with manpower in mind. This must be done by deciding what missions
the Navy will be carrying out and the policies of the United States. The Navy will then be
able to construct ships using available technology with a set number of personnel in order
to man them. The manning plans for the Arsenal ship illustrate this.
Over the past 100 years ship size has been the primary variable in manning a ship.
Specifically the bigger the ship, the more men required. It has also been determined that
ship size is important for future upgrades in technology so as to extend ship life.
Therefore, ship upgrades and life cycle cost including manpower must play a part in the
development of future platforms, like the Arsenal ship and SC 21.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ASSESSMENT
Smart Ship will most likely pass any evaluation or assessment conducted by the
United States Navy. A successful assessment will not be due to bias on the evaluators'
part, but because of a "Hawthorne effect" by the part of the crew. Specifically, all of the
attention, new training and equipment will generate enthusiasm and pride within the crew.
The pride and high moral of the crew will allow them to pass any evaluation under any
circumstances.
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Other factors which bias the assessment is the Commanding Officer's power of
picking which crew members stay, and which crew members will be left behind at the
beginning of the deployment. The Commanding Officer's picks will contribute to a
successful experiment due to the trust and confidence felt by the crew in their capabilities.
While the CO will be limited to picking only assigned crew members, he would not pick
non-performers over "hot runners".
The deployment is another unfortunate factor in the assessment of Smart Ship.
Even though deploying to the Caribbean for drug operations might be equal to a
deployment in the Mediterranean, it will not be perceived that way by the rest of the fleet.
Specifically, the length is shorter, the support is closer and the OPTEMPO slower. Time
is what causes malfunction and wear, wear not only in equipment, but in personnel. If this
deployment is used for the assessment, it will be regarded with suspicion by the rest of the
fleet, regardless of the success.
Convincing the fleet of the wisdom of Smart Ship action needs to be the primary
goal of the assessment. Unfortunately, even with favorable cost and benefit figures, the
fleet will not be totally convinced that Smart Ship will work. Without the approval of the
fleet, using "waterfront standards", Smart Ship will fail.
The surface Navy has always tried to perform at its best, even when dealt low crew
moral and decreased material readiness. If the fleet feels betrayed, due to increased
workloads, degrading systems from neglect and improper maintenance, then the Navy of




Further study should be completed on Smart Ship and the USS Yorktown after the
deployment. Studies should incorporate earlier work completed at CNA by examining
ship readiness using material condition and training reports such as SORTs. This will
provide better information on how reduced manning affects readiness.
Further study should also be completed on other alternatives. There are several
alternatives the Navy can take, but, it must have an understanding of, the probable cost
and benefits before undertaking them. This can only be achieved through cost benefit
analysis.
Recalling the quote from Admiral Bradley Fiske, to have a great Navy does not
mean keeping as many ships as we can, but in keeping those ships we have, ready to fight
at a moments notice, to defend our country's policies.
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APPENDIX A: COST SAVINGS OF SMART SHIP
Two approaches can be used to predict the cost savings of Smart Ship. The
following information is known:
Total number of ships (combatants) affected=l 19
Average manning for ships affected = 401
Average number of Enlisted/ship =376
Average number of Officers/ship = 25
1996 mean annual cost (includes pay, benefits, housing, retirement, etc)
Officers= $75,726
Enlisted= $33,623
1996 Navy End Strength = 424,500
1996 DoN Budget =$79,252.3 million








Cost smed^ (Per$omielekmjtmed)(wages, training cost, benefits and'hastepay)
or
Equation 2.





Personnel eliminated (PE) = (number of people reduced / ship)(number of ships affected)
PE = 100 people/ship (119 ships) = 1 1900 personnel in the Navy. However, this
does not allow us to know which ones, officer or enlisted?
Therefore:
if average manning = 401 with 25 officers and 376 enlisted then assuming equal reductions
across grades yields
94 enlisted and 6 officers =100 people / ship
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Therefore Cost saved using equation 1
:
^officers ($75,72® + 94 enlisted ($33,623)}U9 ships - S430J7SJ42 peryear :
$430,175,242 $79,252,300,000 =.00542 or .54% oj'DoN budget yearly
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Using equation 2.
Percent of total force reduce = 1 1900 personnel / 424,500 = .0280 or 2.8%
Therefore cost saved:
;.;.;.;:-.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;:;.;.;.;.;.;.;.%;.;. -.v.v.v.v. -.-.-.v.-. .*,*.-. -,-,-. -.-.-.-. .'..•,'.•.-,•.•.,:.-..
- 2.B% a7MUWMW^$476M2M$per year
or
$476,602,000 is.60% ofthe DoNBudget
LYlYiYiYfiYiYlYiYiYiYiYiYlYlWlYlYiYiYiYlYliYiiYiYiiiiYiYW^
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There is a .06% or $46,426,758 difference in the two equations. Equation 1 is
assumed to be more accurate because individual unit cost are provided. These figures are
provided by BUPERS, and are being used by the Smart Ship project. Equation 2 is
assumed to be the absolute maximum savings the Smart Ship could justify.
New technology cost are not used in the equation because they are a sunk cost.
This cost is $5.8 million / ship for 1 19 possible combatants.
The savings shown by equation 1 and equation 2 assume that all personnel reduced
are eliminated from end strength. The savings is also assumed to be linear. This may not be
true. Specifically, the training cost are part of the average annual mean cost for personnel.
Therefore, as personnel are reduced throughout the system, the average cost per student
trained will increase, assuming training is held constant. Hence, the annual mean cost will
increase, resulting in increased marginal savings per year.
The savings also is computed for all 1 19 combatants being outfitted starting in year
1996. This is logistically impossible, therefore these savings are quite high, compared to
actual savings that could be obtained.
Inflation is not accounted for. However, assuming the customary 3% cost of living
raise, this would increase the savings marginally for Smart Ship.
The total number of combatants is held at 119/ year. If this number increases,
Smart ship would have marginal increases in savings. The same is true if ships are
eliminated, and savings would decrease.
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APPENDIX B: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
FY 1997 BUDGET SUMMARY BY APPROPRIATION
Department of the Navy
FY 1997 Budget Summary by Appropriation
(In Millions of Dollars)
FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997
Military Personnel, Navy 17,751.8 17,021.5 16,943.0
Military Personnel, Marine Corps 5,735.5 5,843.3 6,102.1
Reserve Personnel, Navy 1,413.6 1,379.4 1,386.3
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps 351.8 378.2 381.1
Operation and Maintenance, Navy 22,094.6 21,359.0 20,196.2
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps 2,139.0 2,420.5 2,203.8
Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve 842.3 837.7 843.9
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Reserve 84.8 102.3 99.7
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 4,593.7 4,443.7 5,882.0
Weapons Procurement, Navy 2,377.3 1,765.9 1,400.4
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 6,485.9 6,496.8 4,911.9
Other Procurement, Navy 3,268.2 2,421.4 2,714.2
Procurement, Marine Corps 539.3 638.9 555.5
RDT&E, Navy 8,606.3 8,419.7 7,334.7
Military Construction, Navy 392.6 554.6 525.4
Military Construction, Navy Reserve 22.7 19.1 11.0
Family Housing, Navy and Marine Corps 1,203.6 1,573.4 1,417.9
National Defense Sealift Fund 699.4 1,024.2 963.0
Environmental Restoration, Navy - - 302.9
Base Closure and Realignment 1,754.6 2,501.7 1,445.0
Payment to Kaho'olawe 60.7 51.0 25.0
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Department of the Navy
FY 1997 Budget Summary by Appropriation
(In Millions of Dollars)
TOTAL $80,417.7 $79,252.3 $75,645.0
Source: Internet, Highlights of the DoN FY 1997 Budget.
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APPENDIX C: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY
Department of the Navy
Military Personnel, Navy
(In Millions of Dollars)
FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997
Pay and Allowances of Officers 4,341.0 4,303.3 4,299.9
Pay and Allowances of Enlisted 12,048.2 11,439.3 11,132.8
Pay and Allowances ofMidshipmen 36.6 35.7 35.3
Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel 538.6 526.0 737.4
Permanent Change of Station Travel 643.7 589.2 593.8
Other Military Personnel Cost 143.7 128.1 143.9
TOTAL: MPN $17,751.8 $17,021.5 $16,943.0
End Strength, DoN, Navy Personnel
Officers 58,788 58,400 56,100
Enlisted 371,670 362,100 346,800
Midshipmen/NAVCADS 4,159 4,000 4,000
TOTAL: End Strength 434,617 424,500 406,900
Source: Internet, highlights ofDoN FY 1997 budget.
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P, is the average basic pay for the ith paygrade.
N, is the number of personnel in that paygrade
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